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Of all the great questions which confront the highest
federal appellate court, there is none in such a nebulous condition as the valuation of public utilities for the purpose of regulating rates. The law is not only difficult to apply, but also
difficult to state. It is of so recent an origin that it can hardly
be said that many points are well settled. The words of Mr.
Justice Brewer are just as applicable today as when he stated
them :1
"Few cases are more difficult or perplexing than those which
involve an inquiry whether the rates prescribed by a state legislature
for the carriage of passengers arid freight are unreasonable. And
yet this difficulty affords no excuse for a failure to examine and
solve the question involved."
The purpose of this article is to 'select from the cases which
have been before the United States Supreme Court questions
which are the most interesting. The reason that the inquiry is
confined to the views of the Supreme Court is that nearly all
questions which arise in rate regulation can be made federal
questions. This being the case, it is more important to determine how the Supreme Court of the United States view these
2 Chicago, etc., R. R. v. Tompkins, 176 U. S. 113 (1899).
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questions, than the many state courts. This will be by no means
a comprehensive study of the cases, and many points will, no
doubt, be suggested in the mind of the reader which are not
covered in this article.
WHERE IS THE POWER TO REGULATE RATES TO BE CLASSED?

It is not merely an academic question to classify the power
to regulate rates, but rather a real substantial question. If this
power is in its fundamental characteristics a branch of the
power of eminent domain, then all the rules of eminent domain
relative to the determination of what is property, and what is
the proper method of valuing that property are necessarily pertinent in the valuation of property for the purpose of rate regulation. But on the other hand, if it is essentially a part of the
police power, then the rules of eminent domain are not so
pertinent.
2
The power of every state has been classified by one writer
into six classes: power of taxation; power of levying special
assessments; power of requiring personal services; power of
destruction from necessity; power of eminent domain; and
police power.
It is obvious that the power to regulate rates cannot be
classed under the power of taxation, for that is a power to
impose a pecuniary burden for the support of the government,3
while the former is a power to establish an equitable rate for
a service which is affected by a public interest. Nor can this
power be classed under the powers of levying special assessments, of requiring personal services, or of destruction from
necessity. By this process of elimination, the only two powers
remaining are the power of eminent domain, and the police
power.
One argument which may be advanced in support of the
contention that the Supreme Court of the United States consider
the power to regulate rates as part of the power of eminent
'Nichols: The Power of Eminent Domain (I9O9), §§ i-18.
'U. S. v. R. R. Co., 17 Wall 322 (U. S. 1872)
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domain is the frequent references made to that power. Only a
few of them need be cited here. In Reagan v. Farmers' Loan
and Trust Company 4 where the rates of a railroad had been
regulated by a Texas commission, and the question was whether
they were confiscatory, Mr. Justice Brewer made the argument
that if the state were to take over these railroads under its
power of eminent domain the Constitution would require that
the corporation be paid just compensation. He then asks, "Is
there any less a departure from the obligations of justice to
seek to take not the title but the use for public benefit . . . ?"5
In Willcox v. Consolidated Ga&Company 6 where the rates

of a gas company had been regulated, the Court cited as an
authority for the proposition that a franchise was property and
had a value which must be considered in the valuation of the
company's property for the purpose of rate regulation, Monongahela Company v. United States 7 which was a taking by eminent
domain." And in German Alliance Insurance Company v. Kansas,9 Mr. Justice Lamar in speaking of whether a business was
affected by a public use said, if it were not it could not be taken,
"whether the taking be of the fee for a lump sum assessed in
condemnation proceedings, or whether the use be taken by rate
regulation, which is but another method of exercising the same
power."
But it is submitted that the power to regulate rates is not
a part of the power of eminent domain. It is not, as it has been
'154 U. S. 362, 410 (1893).
'Quoted with approval in Covington, etc., Turnpike Co. v. Sanford, 164
U. S. 578, 594 (i896).
6212 U. S. 19, 44 (J9o8).
'148 U. S. 312 (1893). In Ames v. Rwy., 64 Fed. I65, 177 (894),
Brewer, J., used the analogy to eminent domain, and this was followed by
Judge Ross in San Diego Land Co. v. National City, 74 Fed. 79, 83 (896).
(1896).
'Eminent domain cases were cited as authorities in valuation questions
in the following rate regulation cases: Chicago, etc., R. R. v. Tompkins, supra,
note i; Minn. Rate Case, 230 U. S. 352, 451 (1913).

"There cannot well be

one basis for condemnation, and another for determining whether regulations illegal because confiscatory," W. C. Bailey, Esq.: The Legal Basis for
Rate Regulation, ii COL. L. Rnv. 534 (911).
'233 U. S. 389, 429 (1914) This is taken from the dissenting opinion.
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termed, "a pro tanto condemnation."' 10

In order to be a "tak-

ing," a something must exist and be property of value. The
public utility never had a property right to charge rates which
exceeded the legal rate, which has been termed the reasonable
rate; it was only legally entitled to this reasonable rate." If
that part of the rate which the utility was not legally entitled to is
taken away from it, there can be no taking of property without
due process of law. When the legislature either directly or indirectly establishes the valid maximum rates for a public service corporation nothing has been taken, for nothing which had
a legal value has been taken; the utility still can charge the legal
rate.' 2 If the power to regulate rates were essentially like the
power of eminent domain, then when the legislature reduced the
rates to a legal maximum, compensatiori would have to be made
to the utility.
It is fundamental law that in eminent domain proceedings
the owner of the property is entitled to a notice and hearing
upon the question of the value of his property which is to be
taken.'3 Yet in the valuation of property for the purpose of rate
regulation, there has recently appeared a doubt in the minds of the
Court whether a notice and hearing is essential. The cases
will not be discussed here, but are cited only to show that the
Supreme Court could not have classified the two powers under
the one head.'4 In Omaha v. Omaha Water Company,' 5 where

the valuation of a water plant was for the purpose of public
purchase under the terms of the ordinance which authorized the
construction, the Court drew a distinction betwen such cases and
those where the valuation was for the purpose of rate regula" Judge Hough in Consolidated Gas Co. v. New York, 157 Fed. 849
(907).
11
Munn v. Ill., 94 U. S. 113 (1876).
Of course the maximum rates established must allow the proper return, or else there is a confiscation.
" Supra, note 2, § 298.
"Home Telephone Co. v. Los Angeles, 211 U. S. 265, 278 (1908). See
also San Diego Land Co. v. National City, 154 U. S. 362 (893), where a
slight doubt is also cast upon the necessity of the provisions. A full discussion of this point will follow.
is218 U. S. i8o, 203 (igo9).
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tion. Again while the power of eminent domain cannot be bargained away, 16 nevertheless the power to regulate the rates of a
public service corporation can. 1
If the extended definition of eminent domain which was
urged by Judge Cooley be accepted, then it could well be argued
that rate regulation was a division of eminent domain. He defines eminent domain as
"the rightful authority, which exists in every sovereignty, to control
and regulate those rights of a public nature which pertain to its
citizens in common, and to appropriate and control individual property for the public benefit, as the public safety, necessity, convenience, or welfare may demand.""'
Although it has received the sanction of writers, and of some
courts in their dicta, it has never been accepted by the courts in
general and has been pointed out by one writer as objectionable. 9
The only power now remaining is the police power. No one
20
can read the rate regulation cases from the Granger Cases
down to the present day without being impressed with the idea
that the Court base the power to regulate the rates of a public
utility on the police power of the state. 2 ' That is, the Court
have justified the power of the state to do this on the ground
that it was a police measure. That cannot now be doubted,
but what can be doubted, and what is doubted, is whether the
Court have treated this power as a part of the so-called police
"'Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 168 U. S. 685 (1897);
Nichols: The Power of Eminent Domain (igog), § 305.
"Infra, note 27.
I Cooley: Const. Lims., 524.
"Lewis: Eminent Domain (io9), voL I, § 2.
'94 U. S. 113, et seq. (1876).
2'The power of the federal government to regulate rates cannot be
based on the police power, as it is understood to exist in the states, for it
has no such power. It is based upon the power to regulate foreign and
interstate commerce, although it may be considered as a part of that socalled police power which has been attached to the express power of regulating foreign and interstate commerce. See the Lottery Case, 188 U. S.
321 (19o3); Hipolite Egg Co. v. U. S., 220 U. S. 45 (1911), supporting the
Federal Pure Food and Drug Act; Hoke v. U. S., 227 U. S. 3o8 (pi2),
supporting the White Slave Act.
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power as it is generally understood. It is submitted that a
study of the cases will justify the statement that the Court have
not treated the power to regulate rates as a part of the power
which they claimed was the reason fof its existence.
One of the best statements of the nature and scope of the
police power was given by Mr. Justice Brown in Lawton v.
Steele.22 He said:
"It is universally conceded to include everything essential to
public safety, health and morals, and to justify destruction or abatement by summary proceedings of whatever may be regarded as public nuisances."
After thus stating the scope of this power, he gave concrete
examples of its exercise:
"Under this power it has been held that the state may order
the destruction of a house falling to decay or otherwise endangering
the lives of passersby; the demolition of such that are in the path
of conflagration; the slaughter of diseased cattle; the destruction of
decayed or unwholesome food; the prohibition of wooden buildings

in cities; the regulation of railways and other means of public con-

veyance, and of interment in burial grounds; the restriction of objectionable trades to localities; the compulsory vaccination of children; the confinement of insane or those afflicted with contagious
disease; the restraint of vagrants, beggars and habitual drunkards;
the suppression of publications and houses of ill fame; and the prohibition of gambling-houses and places where intoxicating liquors
are sold."
This is a typical illustration of the way the Court have
spoken of the power to regulate railways, which must also necessarily include the power to regulate all public service utilities.
But if all of these belong in the same class, why are not all of
them treated alike? Why can certain phases of trade be prohibited in the interest of public health and morals without one
cent of compensation, 23 but the rates of a utility must not be
= 152 U. S. 133 Cx894).
'Oleomargarine:. Powell v. Penna., 127 U. S. 678 (1888); Plumley v.
Mass., 155 U. S. 461 (x894); Hammond Packing Co. v. Montana, 233 U. S.

331 (I914).

Intoxicating liquors: Mugler v. Kansas,

123

U. S. 623 (1887).

Prohibition of laundry business during certain hours of the night: Barbier
v. Connelly, 113 U. S. 27 (885).
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lower than will earn a non-confiscatory return?" The same
question could be asked of all these so-called similar illustrations
of the exercise of the police power, such as prohibition of
wooden buildings in cities, and destruction of decayed or dangerous buildings.
The difference in the exercise of the so-called police power
and the power to regulate rates can as well be pointed out, if
the illustrations are confined to regulations of railroads. Why
must a railroad be allowed a non-confiscatory return, if it can
be compelled to construct overhead or subway crossings at its
own expense ?25 And it would seem to make no difference if
the railroad would be forced into bankruptcy due to its uncompensated obedience to the police power of the state in erecting
these crossings. Yet it cannot be so ruined by rate regulation. Is
the fact that the railroad is bankrupt less important than the
method by which it is thrown into bankruptcy? Why must the
schedule of rates be non-confiscatory, when a railroad can be
compelled to submit to certain regulations, although by so doing
it suffers a great loss ?26 If the power to regulate rates is in the
same category as the power to legislate for the health, safety
and morality of the people, why can the State contract the former
away,2 7 and not the latter?
Smyth v. Ames, i69 U. S. 466 (1898) ; San Diego Land & Town Co.
v. Jasper, i89 U. S. 439 (i9o3); Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.
S. 19 (igog); Minnesota Rate Cases, 23o U. S. 352 (1913).
Cincinnati, etc., R. R. v. Connersville, 218 U. S. 336 (igio) and cases
cited therein. Uncompensated obedience to a regulation enacted for public
safety under the police power is not a taking without due process of law,
Chicago, etc., Rwy. v. Ill., 200 U. S. 56i (i9o6). A city can even open a
highway near the tracks of a railroad and compel the railroad to put in an
overhead bridge, Chicago, etc., Rwy. v. Minneapolis, 232 U. S. 43o (914).
"A state can require certain heating apparatus to be installed in trains.
N. Y., etc., R. R. v. N. Y., i65 U. S. 628 (1897) ; that three regular passenger trains stop each way daily at any village with at least three thousand inhabitants, Lake Shore R. R. v. Ohio, i73 U. S. 286 (x899); that
trains slow down in a city to a certain speed, Erb v. Morasch. 177 U. S.
584 (igoo); that cattle trains maintain certain speed, Chicago, etc., R. R. v.
Comm., 228 U. S. 70 (913).
"Detroit v. Citizen Rwy. Co., 184 U. S. 368 (1902); Vicksburgh v.
Water Works, 2o6 U. S. 496 (x9o7). But the contract restricting this undoubted governmental right must be expressed in clear and unmistakable
terms, and all doubts will be resolved in favor of the retention of the power.
Railroad Commission Cases, ii6 U. S. 307 (i886); Stanislaus County v.
San Joaquin C. & I. Co., 192 U. S. 2oi (1904).
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When such questions are pointed out, it proves conclusively
that the power to regulate rates cannot be a part of the power
to legislate for the health, safety and morals of the people. The
statement that the police power includes "the regulation of railways and other means of conveyance," cannot possibly include
the power to regulate the rates of the railways, but only the
operation of the railroad which has a direct bearing on the
health and safety of the people. The very fact that the state
can bargain away the power to regulate rates and cannot bargain away the power to compel roads to install safety devices and
proper crossings, is an unanswerable proof that the powers are
essentially different. Dr. Harrison Standish Smith was convinced of this when he wrote:2 s
"A matter of some interest is suggested by the court's assertion
that immunity from rate control may be given a railroad charter.
It has always been said that the fixing of rates is an exercise of the
police power. Yet it is a well settled doctrine of the police power
that a state cannot dispossess itself of that power-cannot contract
it away. It would seem, therefore, that rate regulation is not in
reality a phase of the police power, but that it stands on a different
basis."
It is too late now to argue that the Court should not treat
the power of rate regulation as a phase of the police power.
Decision upon decision has ruled that it is and it is inconceivable
that the Court would change this view. But it is at least possible
so to divide the police power and classify the various phases of it,
that there need be no inconsistent results. It has been pointed
out by a recent writer that the Supreme Court have used the
term police power not only to include that branch of legislation
which is essential to the public safety, health and morals, but
also have used it "in a broader sense to denote all the power of
government which the states did not expressly or impliedly surrender by the adoption of the Federal Constitution, a power
which has no bounds except those imposed by the Federal Constitution." 29
'Publications of the American Economic Association, May, i9o6, pp.
23, 4-The general police power of the city does not include power to regulate
rates, Mills v. Chicago, 127 Fed. 731 (i904).
29 Reeder:
Validity of Rate Regulations (i9r4), iio and notes.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND RATE REGULATION

9

If,then, the power to regulate rates is classified under
this second branch of the police power, it is not so hard to
answer the questions which were put forward earlier in the
article. As it is not a phase of the power which legislates for
the health, safety and morals of the people, but a part of an allreaching governmental power which was not given up by the
adoption of the Constitution, the state can contract it away the
same as it can contract away the power to tax.8 0 As this power
is subject to the Fourteenth Amendment, and the power to regulate for the health, safety, and morals is not,"' it is not hard
to see why the rates cannot be lowered beyond the line of a nonconfiscatory return, while grade crossings, safety devices, and
full crew measures may be imposed even if they cause great loss.
THE VARIOUS THEORIES OF VALUATION.

The property of any public service corporation may be
valued for one of four purposes: (I) taxation, (2) accounting
and capitalization, (3) public purchase, and (4)'rate regulation.1 The purpose of the valuation is the main consideration,
in determining what and how miuch shall be included. That
a franchise has value for the purpose of taxation, is not of
itself a reason for giving it value for the purpose of rate regulation. 2 It is clear that the purpose of each is radically different;
the former is to raise revenue, and the other is to establish an
equitable rate for a service which is affected by a public interest.
In view of these divergent purposes, it is essential to point out
in the beginning that this article will deal only with the question of valuation for the purpose of rate regulation.
There are three theories or methods of making this valuaNew Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch 164 (U. S.1812); Wright v. Georgia
R. R., etc., Co., 216 U. S. 42o (191o); but such an immunity from taxation

or rate regulation does not accompany the property of the utility in its
transfer to a purchaser, in the absence of express direction in the statute to
that effect, St. Louis and San Fran. Rwy. Co., i56 U. S. 649 (i895).
'Barbier v. Connelly, supra, note 23; Mo. Pac. R. R. v. Humes, 115
U. S. 512 (1885); Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Goldboro, 232 U. S. 558
(1914).
'Whitten: Valuation of Public Service Corporations (1912), §§ 1-12.
'Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19 (1912).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

10

tion which are generally advocated: (i) actual cost, (2) market
value as a going concern, (3) cost of reproduction, either deducting or not deducting depreciation. 3
In short, the actual cost theory adopts the original cost of
the plant plus the cost of all additions and betterments which
are proper charges to the capital account and not due to replacements and renewals. The market value theory requires that a
value be found equal to the sum which a ready buyer would
offer to a ready seller for a going business concern. The third
theory demands the valuation of a reproduced plant which is
sufficient to furnish an adequate present day service, with or
without the proper allowance for depreciation due to use and
age. It is evident that the cost of reproduction may mean: (a)
the cost of a substantially identical reproduction of the existing
plant; or (b) the cost of a substitute plant of the most modern,
approved design, capable of performing the same service as the
existing plant.4
In this discussion no argument will be made in advocacy
of any particular theory. It is immaterial which will bring the
greatest blessing to all concerned. All that is hoped to be done,
by the review of the cases, is to point out how each theory was
received by the Supreme Court and the growing tendency of the
Court to adopt one of the three theories as the basis of all rate
making valuations.
Although the Supreme Court have been considering this
problem since 1885, yet they are not prepared to lay down any
strict formula to guide the regulating bodies. As was said in
a recent case, "Each case must rest upon its special facts." 5
Therefore it seems most helpful to study the attitude of the Supreme Court by a historical review of the cases.
Apparently the first cases where a theory of valuation was
'Whitten: Valuation of Public Service Corporations

(1912), p. 40. WyPublic Service Corporations (1911), §§ 1080-1112, advocates four
theories; (i) original cost, which was the common law basis; (2) outstanding capitalization; (3) present value; (4) cost of reproduction; and Pond:

man:

Public Utilities (913)

§ 437, suggests the same four theories.

'Whitten, §§ 73-75.
'Hughes, J., in Minn. Rate Cases, 23o U. S. 352, 434

(1912).
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considered were the Railroad Commission Cases.6 Here a
trustee under a mortgage brought a bill in the federal court to
enjoin the commission of Mississippi from regulating the intrastate rates of the railroad. The commission was authorized
and directed to "revise such tariffs as to allow a fair and just
return on the value of such railroad." The theory of the bill
was that this provision, along with others, impaired the obligation of a contract made by the state with the road by a charter
provision empowering its directors to regulate the tolls. The
bill was dismissed by the majority of the Court on the ground
that the charter provision was not a contract that the directors
alone should fix the tolls, and therefore no contract had been
impaired by the statute authorizing regulation by the commission. But there appears in the dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Field, the thought that the true theory
of valuation is actual cost.
It will be noticed that the act did not provide any theory
of valuation, but only required a "fair and just return on the
value of such railroad." This, according to Mr. Justice Harlan,
violated the contract of the state with the railroad, for the commissioners were "required to fix rates, according to the value of
the property, without any reference to what it originally cost,
or what it had cost to maintain it in fit condition for public
use," while the proper method would be to fix the rates according to the actual cost of the plant. The directors of the road
would have fixed the rates according to the actual cost and
a provision which makes any other lesser value the basis, violates this contract.
And Mr. Justice Field dissented for the same reason, i.e.,
ii6 U. S. 3o7 (1885). It is true that in Peik v. Chicago, etc., Rwy. Co.,
94, U. S. 164, 176 (1876), Waite, C. J., did state: "In Munn v. Ill., supra, p.
113 and Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Iowa, supra, p. 155, we
did decide that the state may limit the amount of charges by railroad companies for rates and freight, unless restrained by some contract in the charter,
even though their income may have been pledged as security for the payment
of obligations incurred upon the faith of the charter." This at first would
lead one to think that actual cost as represented by stocks and bonds had no
importance whatever. But it will be recalled that at this period the thought
was that the rates set by the regulating body could not be reviewed by the
Court, and hence the Court had no reference to any theory of valuation.

12
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that the act required the commissioners to value on the theory
of reproduction. He said:
"But the act of Mississippi allows only such compensation as
parties appointed by the legislature

.

...

shall determine to be

a fair return on the value of the road, and its appurtenances, though
that may be much less than the original cost. Within the last few
years, such have been the improvements in machinery, and such the
decline in the cost of materials, that it is probably less expensive by
one-third to build and equip the road now than it was when the constructors completed it. Does anybody believe that they would have
undertaken the work or proceeded with it, had they been informed
that, notwithstanding their vast outlays, they should only be
allowed, when it was finished, to receive a fair return upon its value,
however much less than cost that might be?"
7
The next case is the ambiguous case of Dow v. Beidelman.
Early in April, 1887, the Arkansas legislature enacted that all
railroads in the state over seventy miles in length could only
charge a maximum of three cents per mile for intrastate passenger transportation. Later in the same month the railroad property in question was sold under a mortgage foreclosure and a
new company organized. It was this last company which complained that the statute confiscated its property. The original
cost of the road was four million dollars, with a mortgage of two
million eighty-five thousand dollars. It was argued, that under
the three cent tariff the net revenue would pay less than onehalf per cent. of the original cost, and only a little over two
per cent. on its bonded indebtedness. This contention was
clearly in line with the arguments of Mr. Justice Harlan and
Mr. Justice Field. But it was rejected by the Court as not the
proper evidence, who intimated that the proper basis of valuation was market value as represented by the price paid at the
sale under the foreclosure, only a month or so before. Mr. Justice Gray said:
"It certainly cannot be presumed that the price paid at the sale
under the decree of foreclosure equalled the original cost of the
road, or the amount of the outstanding debt. Without any proof of
'49 Ark. 325 (1887); 125 U. S. 68D, 690 (1887). It might well be
argued that this case stood for no rule as to valuation, because the Court
yet doubted whether they had the right to review the maximum rates fixed
by the legislature.
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the sum invested by the reorganized corporation or its trustees, the
court has no means . . . of determining that the rate of three
cents a mile fixed by the legislature is unreasonable."
It might be contended that the Court regarded the actual
cost in this case to be represented by what the last company
actually invested in the road, and that the market value theory
was not intended to be used as the basic element. Yet this
must give way to what was said in a later case s that this case
decided that "price is evidence, we might say, more important
evidence than original cost!'
If the Court in this case did regard the market value
theory as the proper test, they soon abandoned that idea and
never again made it the basis of a valuation. In Reagan v.
Farmers Loan and Trust Company,9 Mr. Justice Brewer said:
"But we do hold that a general averment in a bill that the tariff
as established is unjust and unreasonable, is supported by the admitted facts that the road cost far more than the amount of stocks
and bonds outstanding; that such stock and bonds represent money
"
invested in its construction.
Here it will be noticed that there was no "watered stock,"
but rather the actual cost was greater than the amount of stock.
The thought here is that the actual cost of the road is better
evidence of value than the amount of the outstanding stocks
and bonds. This certainly smacks of the actual cost theory, especially when it was conceded that the plant could be reproduced
for about fifteen million dollars less than the actual cost.
But with the advent of the leading case of Smyth v. Ames, 10
the Supreme Court appear to have dropped the actual cost theory

'San

Diego Land Co. v. Jasper, 189 U. S. 443 (1902).
U. S. 362, 412 (May 26, 1884). Mr. Whitten cites this case for
market value theory, supra, note I, § 6o. This quotation is especially interesting in the light of what Mr. Justice Brewer said in Ames v. Rwy., 64
Fed. i65, 177 (March 12, 1894): "If it be said that the rates must be
such as to secure the owner a reasonable per cent. on the money invested,
it will be remembered that many things have happened to make the investment far in excess of the actual value of the property-injudicious contracts,
poor engineering, unusually high cost of materials, rascality on the part
of those engaged in the construction or management of the property."
Covington, etc., Turnpike Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578 (1896), seems to
be based on the principle that actual cost is the basic element.
"669 U. S. 466, 545 ('898).
' 154

14
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as the basic element. It is true that in the opinions of both the
Circuit Court and the Supreme Court, language can be found
which will tend toward a consideration of the actual cost, yet
the trend of both opinions is toward thd present value, whether
it be more or less than actual cost. Mr. Justice Harlan said:
"We hold, however, that the basis of all calculations as to the
reasonableness of the rates to be charged by a corporation maintaining a highway under legislative sanction, must be the fair value of
the property being used by it for the convenience of the public."
This is to be the basic element-the fair value at the present
day of the property used in the public service. But so that the
commissioners may not run wild with this theory, it is to be
checked up by the actual cost of the plant and other considerations, for in continuing he said:
"And in order to ascertain that value, the original cost of construction, the amount expended in permanent improvements, the
amount and market value of its bonds and stocks, the present as
compared with the original cost of construction, the probable earning capacity of the property under the particular rates prescribed by
statute, and the sum required to meet operating expenses, are all
matters for consideration, and are to be given such weight as may
be just and right in each case."
And in order that he would not miss any fact in the consideration, he added:
"We do not say that there may not be other matters to be regarded in estimating the value of the property. What the company
is entitled to ask is a fair return upon the value of that which it employs for the public convenience. On the other hand, what the public is entitled to demand is that no more be extracted from it for the
use of a public highway than the services rendered by it are reasonably worth."
Admitting that the company is entitled to have its property
appraised at its present value, it still leaves open the question
which of the two standards is to be adopted to determine this
value, the market value theory, or the reproduction, with or
without depreciation, value theory.
If the opinion in the above case is examined for its bearing
on this question, the reproduction theory will be found to be
underlying its thought. Not only does Mr. Justice Harlan speak
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of the present cost of construction as contrasted with the original
cost, but he also, with much satisfaction, notices and comments,
on the fact that his own finding that the proposed rates are
unjustifiable is supported by the Board of Transportation for
Nebraska, who ascertained the value "not by taking the cost of
construction and equipments, nor the amount of the stocks and
bonds issued per mile, but by making

.

.

computations upon

the basis of what it would cost to duplicate the property at the
present time.""
In answer to the railroads' contention that to constitute
due process of law the rate must be such as will give a reasonable
return on the actual cost as represented by all the outstanding
2
indebtedness and the capital stock, he said:'
"It is unsound in that it practically excludes from consideration
the fair value of the property used.

.

.

. The apparent value of

the property and franchises used by the corporation, as represented
by its stocks and bonds and obligations, is not alone to be considered
when determining the rates that may be reasonably charged."
This same thought was taken over by the same Justice in
San Diego Land Company v. National City.'3 In answer to the
argument that the basis of valuation should be the actual cost
of the plant, he said:
"The basis of calculation suggested by the appellant, is, however, defective in not requiring the real value of the property and
the fair value in themselves of the service renderd to be taken into
consideration. What the company is entitled to is a fair return
upon the reasonable value of the property at the time it is being
used for the public. The property may have cost more than it ought
to have cost, and its outstanding bonds for money borrowed and
which went into the plant, may be in excess of the real value of the
property. So that it cannot be said that the amount of such bonds
should, in every case, control the question of rates, although it may
be an element in the inquiry as to what is, all the circumstances considered, just to both the company and the public."
Ibid., page 549.
"Ibid., page 544.
174 U. S. 739, 757 (i898).
The theory of the lower court as represented in 74 Fed. 79 (1896), was the reproduction value. After commenting on the many considerations which must be taken into account, he
added (p. 83) : "In my judgment it is the actual value of the property at the
time the rates are to be fixed that should form the basis...
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This is proof sufficient to convince one that at this time
the proper basic theory was considered the reproduction theory.
The allusions to the actual cost, stocks and bonds, are only
brought in to check up the result. This .theory was still adhered
to in Chicago, Milwaukee, etc., Railway v. Tompkins.1 4 In this
case District Judge Carland arrived at the present value upon the
reproduction theory. As his valuation was accepted by the
Supreme Court as correct, although the case was reversed on
15
other grounds, it is well to quote from his opinion:'
"There is testimony as to the original cost of rolling stock
bought years ago; and there is the estimated cost of a good many
articles of property, by the officers of the company, but in no case
does any witness swear to the present actual value of any piece of
property.

. .

. But the court has carefully examined the testi-

mony introduced in regard to the value of the property in question

.

. . and is unable to find that the present fair value
used for railroad purposes, is to exceed $Io,oooooo. It

is true that the record shows that the property is bonded and mortgaged for an amount largely in excess of this sum,16 but the amount
of a mortgage upon property is no evidence of its value, and, therefore, is not worthy of consideration.Y Neither is the fact that a
railroad company bought engines at a certain price ten or fifteen
years ago, any binding evidence that the engines are now worth a
dollar, in absence of any testimony as to where they have been used,
how they have been kept, and what their present condition is."
The same method of valuation was approved by Mr. Justice
Brewer in Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Company,'although the decision of the lower court, containing the theory,
was overuled upon other grounds; and it was also approved in
Minneapolis and St. Paul Railroad Company v. Minnesota.'9
In this case the railroad refused to adopt a joint rate fixed by
it 176 U. S. 167 (1899).
sgo Fed. 363, 369 (1898).
15$i9,000,0OO.

" This appears to answer Mr. Justice Brewer's question in Ames v.
Rwy., 64 Fed. 179: "Or, to put a case in a little stronger light, suppose
the promoter of the enterprise had been some private citizen, who had advanced his $i6,ooo a mile as a second lien, and that the road could today be
constructed for only $16,ooo a mile. Would it be reasonable and just to so
reduce the rates as to simply pay to the holder of the first lien reasonable
interest, and leave him without any recompense for his investment?"
18713 U. S. 79, 91, 92 (I9o).
9186

U. S.257 (1902).
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the commission. A mandamus was asked for, and one of the
grounds of defense was that the rates were confiscatory. In
sustaining the issuance of the writ the Supreme Court of Minnesota held 20 that the railroad had failed in its proof, in that it
offered evidence of cost of construction, repairs, equipment, and
additions, but not a particle of proof as to the present value or
cost of reproduction. This, said the court, was the theory announced in Dow v. Beidelman,2 1 Smyth v. Ames, 22 and Railroad
v. Tompkins.23 It is well to quote what the court said by way of
conclusion :24
"It is evident that there was a lack of proof as to the present,
as compared with the original, cost of construction, unless as urged
by counsel, we assume that either the amount of the stock and bonds
outstanding or the construction account represent it. We decline to
act upon this assumption, and we do not regard the authority cited
(Ames v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 64 Fed. 177) as so holding."

This language is too strong to be passed without a comment
by the Supreme Court of the United States unless it clearly
represented their views. When the Supreme Court affirmed this
decision, it is maintained that they approved the theory upon
which the lower court proceeded. If they did not think the cost
of reproduction was the true theory, surely they would not have
affirmed the conclusions of the Minnesota court without some
expression, especially when the Court had expressly said that the
cost of reproduction was the theory advanced in several of their
25
former decisions.
The next case which throws light upon this subject is San
8o Minn. I9 r , 204,
"Supra, note 7.

205

(19oo).

= Supra, note o.
Supra, note r4.

"8o Minn. 2o5 (i9oo).

' We are not unmindful that on page 268 (186 U. S.), Mr. Justice
Brewer did state: "Each case must be determined by its own consideration
and while the rule stated in Smyth v. Ames is undoubtedly sound as a
general proposition that railways are entitled to earn a fair return upon the
capital invested, it might not justify them in charging an exorbitant mileage
in order to pay operating expenses, if the condition of the country did not
permit it." But we still maintain that unless the theory of the lower court
had represented the view of the Supreme Court that the judgment would
never have been affirmed without some comment other than the one quoted.
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Diego Land and Town Company v. Jasper et al.26

Mr. Justice

Harlan ruled that it is no longer an open question, but that the
Constitution affords a fair return only upon the reproduction
value of the plant.2 7 He added:
"That is decided, and decided as against the contention that you
are to take the actual cost of the plant, annual depreciation, etc., and
allow a fair profit on that footing over and above expenses.
Yet the only evidence in favor of a higher value in the present case,
is the original cost of the work, seemingly inflated by improper
charges to that account and by injudicious expenditures (being the
cost to another company which sold out on foreclosure to the appellant), coupled with a recurrence to testimony as to the rapid depreciation of the pipes. In this way the appellant makes the value over
a million dollars." 28
In this case it was expressly ruled 29 that neither the Constitution nor justice demanded a valuation on all of the utility's
property, if only part of it was at the present day necessary in
the business. If the actual cost of the plant had been the basic
theory, surely the Court would have allowed the value of all the
property which was bought for the public service, although not
necessary for it. Upon no other than the reproduction theory
can the value of the property not actually needed be discarded.
The death knell of the actual cost theory was sounded by
Mr. Justice Peckham in Stanislaw County v. San Joaquin and
King's River Canal aid Irrigation Company.30 After approving the prior decisions which sustained the reproduction value
theory, he said:
"The actual cost may have been too great. Mistakes of construction, even though honest, may have been made, which necessarily enhanced the cost; more property may have been acquired
than necessary or needful for the purposes intended. Other circumstances might exist which show the original rates much too large
for fair or reasonable compensation at the present time. Notwithstanding such facts, are the shareholders in the company to be for" 89 U. S. 439 (1903).
'For this he cited San Diego Co. v. National City, supra, note 13.

at

"Under the reproduction theory the board estimated the present value
$350,000.00.

2'P. 446.

ao92 U.

S. 201, 214, 215 (904).
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ever entitled to eighteen per cent. upon this cost, and does a reduction in amount

.

.

.

take away property in violation of the

provisions of the Federal Constitution? We think not."
The act 31 under which this valuation was made, after providing that the supervisors should value the property "actually
used or useful" in the appropriation of water, provided that
they "may likewise take into estimation" all other facts and
circumstances "which will make the value just to both." In
commenting upon this, Mr. Justice Peckham said:
"To take the amount actually invested 'into estimation' does
not mean necessarily that such amount is to control the decision of
the question of rates. Other language would have been employed
to express that thought."
Does not this indicate that the Supreme Court were so convinced
of their position, that they did not want any other suggestion to
sweep it aside?
It is true that in these California cases8 2 the valuation was
based upon the statutes which provided that the property
"actually used or useful" in the appropriation of water should
be valued. But this does not sustain the point that in these cases
the Supreme Court were merely construing an act and not developing their own theory of valuation. In one of the cases they
expressly said, after having laid down the reproduction value
theory, that this is what the statute contemplated.83 In San
Diego Land and Town Company v. Jasper,et al,34 the actual cost

was almost a million dollars, while the valuation allowed under
the reproduction theory was only three hundred fifty thousand
dollars. If the actual cost theory had been the true theory of
valuation, would not the act have been unconstitutional as depriving the utility of some six hundred thousand dollars? Surely
it cannot be doubted that if the Federal Constitution contemplates
'Cal. Stat 1885, page 95. In San Diego Land Co. v. Jasper, supra,
note 26, it was ruled that this statute contemplated the reproduction-lessdepreciation theory of valuation.
' San Diego Land Co. v. National City, I74 U. S. 759 (1898); San
Diego Land Co. v. Jasper et al., 189 U. S. 439 (1903); Stanislaus County v.
San Joaquin, etc., Co., 192 U. S. 204 (19o4).
" Supra, note 26, also note 30.
"4Supra, note 26.
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a fair return upon the actual cost of the property, a state statute
or an order of a commission, which does not at least allow that
value, cannot stand.
The first case which definitely stated that in the reproduction value, allowance must be made for depreciation was Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Company.8 5 The Master in his findings
had based the value on the cost of reproduction new, and was
reversed because he had not made allowance for depreciation.
Mr. Justice Moody said:
"The cost of reproduction is one way of ascertaining the
present value of a plant like that of a water company, but that test
would lead to obviously incorrect results, if the cost of reproduction
is not diminished by the depreciation which has come from age and
use.

.

.

.

The cost of reproduction is not always a fair meas-

ure of the present value of a plant that has been in use for many
years. The items composing the plant depreciate in value from year
to year in a varying degree. Some pieces of property.like real estate, for instance, depreciate not at all, and sometimes, on the other
hand, appreciate, in value. But the reservoirs, the mains, the service
pipes, boilers, meters, tools and appurtenances of every kind begin
to depreciate with more or less rapidity from the moment of their
use." So
Counsel for the utility in this case offered another theory
of valuation which the Court promptly rejected. The idea was
that in making the valuation, take the present value of plant as
it actually existed and to this add complete depreciation, which
represents "that part of the original plant which, through destruction or obsolescence, had actually perished as useful property," and incomplete depreciation, which represents "the un35212 U.

S. I, 11, 12 (1909).

" The Court on page 13, said that the utility ought to set aside so much
each year as a depreciation fund, that this was a charge somewhat like
operating expenses, and that it was not only right for the utility to do
this, but that it was its duty. But if it has failed to do this, this fault was
its own, and the present value cannot be enhanced to cover the errors.
But the Court apparently take the ground that extension or improvements constructed from the proceeds of the reserve set aside for depredation, are not to be included in the present value, Railroad Comm. v. Cumberland Tel., etc., Co., 212 U. S. 414 (igog). But this has nothing to do
with a valuation where the surplus earnings, after providing for a depreciation fund, are invested in extensions and additions. This the Court expressly reserved for further consideration.
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impairment in value of the parts of the plant which remained
in existence and were continued in use."
As stated before,87 there are two methods of applying the
reproduction-less-depreciation value theory:
i. Reproduction value of substantially the existing plant.
2. Reproduction value of a substitute plant, of the most
modem approved design, capable of performing the same service
as the existing plant.
The case of Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Company,8 may
be said to adopt the first of these views. The writer realizes
that time and again it has been written, "the whole subject of
valuation is still in a development stage," 89 and that the Supreme Court of the United States have refused to lay down a
hard and fast rule which later might have to be reversed when
'Whitten: Valuation of Public Service Corporations (x92), § 73, 75.
U2r2 U. S. 19 (1909).
'Whitten: Valuation of Public Service Corporations (1912), §72.
The Supreme Court have gone through too many campaigns in the
determination of the correct principles of large questions to be caught without some avenue of escape. In the Willcox Case they have thrown out a
hint that if they ever think that this reproduction theory is not sound, they
wil change to another. In one portion of the opinion, it was said (page
42): "Of course there may be cases where the rate is so low, upon any
reasonable basis of valuation, that there can be no just doubt as to its
confiscatory nature." And again (page So): "It may be, as already suggested, that in many cases the rates objected to might be so low that there
could be no reasonable doubt of their inadequacy upon any fair estimate
of the value of the property."
If the rates will allow a sufficient return upon the value of the property
as determined by the reproduction-less-depreciation theory, what does it
matter that under another theory, the rates may be confiscatory? If this
theory is the proper one, then it matters not what value any other theory
may produce. Language such as that quoted weakens the value of the
actual decision. It makes it almost impossible for one to look into the
future with any degree of clearness. It practically puts the whole subject
back to the days of Smyth v. Ames, supra, note Io.
Another mode the Court have of throwing confusion into the law is
their refusal to correct statements in the lower courts' opinions which doubt
the advisability of the reproduction theory. In the same volume which contains the Knoxville Water Company and the Consolidated Gas Company
Cases, where the actual decisions were based on the reproduction-lessdepreciation theory, is the peculiar case of Railroad Comm. of La. v. Cumberland Tel. Co., 212 U. S. 4i4 (x9o9). In this case the present value of
the telephone company was determined by the regulating body solely upon
the reproduction theory. In the federal court, where the order of the
commission reducing the rates was enjoined, Judge Saunders practically
repudiated this theory as the basic element in valuation, i56 Fed. 823,
833 (1907). And yet the Supreme Court in reversing the decree upon other
grounds did not deem it advisable to correct the impression of the lower
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more light has been thrown on the problem, yet the trend of the
opinions is in the direction of the valuation according to the
reproduction of the things "as they are." In the lower court
Judge Hough emphatically emphasized this in his opinion, 40 and
the Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice Peckham, in adopting
the theory of valuation of the lower court, except as to the ques41
tion of franchises, said:

"And we concur with the court below in holding that the value
of the property is to be determined as of the time when the inquiry
is made regarding the rates."
It will be noticed that the Court speak of the value of
"the property." This ordinarily means the property as then in
existence. Without more comment than this, it would be straining the language to claim that it refers to a "substitute plant, of
the most modem, approved design." And especially so when the
lower court had expressly stated that the value was placed on the
reproduction of the plant then in existence and not of a hypothetical plant.
Yet the authority for this is considerably shaken by their
treatment of Cedar Rapids Gas Light Company v. Cedar
Rapids.42 In valuing this plant the lower court proceeded upon
the theory that, "the worth of a new plant of equal capacity,
efficiency and durability, with proper discount for defects in the
court if it was in error on this point. Does this not suggest the possibility that the members of the Supreme Court, themselves, were also in
doubt? On the other hand, the case was decided only a few weeks after
the other two and there is no express positive repudiation of their theory
of valuation.
"In every instance, however, the
'See 157 Fed. 849, 854 (I907)
value assigned in the report is what it would cost presently to reproduce
each item of property, in its present condition, and capable of giving service
neither better nor worse than it now does. As to all of the items enumerated, therefore, from real estate to meters, inclusive, the complainant demands a fair return upon the reproductive value thereof, which is the same
thing as the present value property considered. To vary this statement:
Complainant's arrangements for manufacturing and distributing gas are

reported to be worth the amounts alone tabulated if disposed of (in the
commercial parlaflice) 'as they are.' Upon authority, I consider this method
of valuation correct." This is very strong language and especially when
Judge Hough cited as authority many of the Supreme Court cases which

we have already considered.

"1Supra, note 38, P. 52.
U. S. 6s5, 670 (1912).
2223
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old and depreciation for use, should be the measure of value
rather than the cost of exact duplication." 43 The decision of the
lower court dismissing the company's bill without prejudice, was
affirmed by the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Holmes, saying:
"In the case the court fixed a value on the plant that exceeded
its cost. . . . Its attitude was fair and we do not feel called
upon to follow the plaintiff into a nice discussion of details."
Although the attitude of the state court may have been
fair enough, yet it is contended that there is such a difference
in the results of the application of the reproduction of things
"as they are," and reproduction 9 f a substitute plant, that the
Court should have pointed out the difference. No one realizes
the difficulties of this great question more than does the writer
and. appreciates that the Court do not want to commit themselves
at a comparatively early period in the development of this law,
yet no end can ever be reached when the highest federal Court
affirm two decisions of valuation based on entirely different
theories, without some comment other than that the attitude of
the lower court "was fair."
The reproduction theory was evidently approved in Lincoln Gas and Electric Light Company v. Lincoln.4 4 In this case
not only did the Court affirm the rule of valuation as applied in
San Diego Land and Town Company v. Jasper, et al,45 but also
apparently approved the reproduction method of valuation
adopted by the lower court,4 6 although the case was sent back to
47
the Master for a more accurate finding of the facts.
The next case 48 which throws light upon this question is
" Opinion of Ladd, J., in i44 Iowa, 426, 438 (igOg).
U. S. 349 (9M2).
"Supra, note 26.
" 223

"See i82 Fed. 926, 977 (909).
'This is the proper practice. Where the utility seeks to enjoin the
enforcement of the rates as prescribed by the commission, the court must
send the case to a Master to determine all the facts and make all the computations. Chicago, etc., Rwy. v. Tompkins, 176 U. S. 167, 179, i8o (i9oo).
But the report of the Master in these cases is not like the report of the Master in other equity cases in that the findings are not regarded as so conclusive. Knoxville v. Water Co., 212 U. S. i (i904).
"It is true that Louisville v. Cumberland Tel. Co., 225 U. S. 530 (W902),
was a rate case, yet the opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes does not help us. And
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the Minnesota Rate Case."9 It is true one can find much language in this case derogative of the reproduction-less-depreciation theory, yet the Supreme Court apparently still favor this
view and were condemning not the use of this theory, but the
abuse.
The valuation was divided into "land," and "property other
than land." The former included the right of way and terminals;
the latter embraced all items of construction, including roadbed, tunnels, structures of every sort, and all appliances and
equipment. The Master and lower court in finding the reproduction value of the land included all cost of acquisition, consequential damages, and "railway value," the latter being a
fictitious sum supposed to represent the value of the land to the
railroad as a part of its system. These values greatly exceeded
the normal value of the land adjacent to the right of way and
terminals of the company. The Court could not see their way
clear to set aside a legislative act upon the ground of confiscation
when the value of the property was represented by such inflated
values. Mr. Justice Hughes said:
"These are the results of endeavors to apply the cost of reproduction method in determining the value of the right-of-way. It is
at once apparent that, so far as the estimate rests upon the supposed
compulsory feature of the acquisitions it cannot be sustained. It is
said that the company would be compelled to pay more than what is
the normal market value of property in transactions between private parties; that it would lack the freedom they enjoy, and, in view
of its needs, it would have to give a higher price. It is also said that
this price would be in excess of the present market value of contiguous or similarly situated property. It might well be asked who
shall describe the conditions that exist, of the exigencies of the
hypothetical owners of the property, on the assumption that the
railroad were removed. But, aside from this, it is impossible to
assume 1o in making a judicial finding of what it would cost to
the report of the lower court in 187 Fed. 637 (I91r), is not much more
satisfactory. The plant was valued at its "present value", but as the statements are so general it is not worth reviewing.
0 23o U. S. 352, 433, 458 (1913).
" The writer italicized this word. It is unfortunate that Mr. Justice
Hughes used the word "assume". It naturally leads one to think that if the
railroads had been able to prove that they were forced to pay more for property than the "fair market value", that he would have considered it as a factor
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acquire the property, that the company would be compelled to pay
more than its fair market value. It is equipped with the governmental power of eminent domain. In view of its public purpose, it
has been granted this privilege in order to prevent advantage being
taken of its necessities. It would be free to stand upon its legal

rights and it cannot be suggested that they would be disregarded."
Moreover, the Justice pointed out that it is foolish to attempt
to estimate the cost of reproducing the road on. the supposition
that the road is not there, while the rock bottom prices for the
reproduction of the land are all based on the presence of the
railroad in the community. He concluded:
"The cost of reproduction method is of service in ascertaining
the present value of the plant, when it is reasonably applied and
where the cost of reproducing the property may be ascertained with
a proper degree of certainty. But it does not justify the acceptance
of results which depend upon mere conjucture."

The question then is, how can this theory be reasonably
applied? This, it is submitted, is answered by the Court when
they ruled out the "railway value," 5' the multipliers, 52 the
allowance for a conjectural cost of acquisition, and consequential
damages ;53 and held that the "increase so allowed apart from any
in the case. As a matter of fact this is what the railroads did prove. It is
just what Judge Sanborn ruled in the lower court (see 1§4 Fed. 8o6):
"But the evidence in this case is conclusive, nay, we may say it is without conflict that every railroad company is compelled to pay more than the normal
market value'of property in sales between private parties for the irregular
tracts it needs and acquires for rights of way, yards and station grounds."
With the evidence and the ruling of the lower court before him, it is impossible to think that Mr. Justice Hughes intended to say to the railroads that if
they proved their contention, it would have been considered. The word
"assume" must be read in the light of all the evidence and holding of the
lower court. It is submitted that Mr. Justice Hughes' thought was that it was
impossible for the court even to consider that the railroad would be compelled
to pay more than the fair market value.
11Page 455: "It is an increment which in the last analysis must rest upon
an estimate of the value of the railroad use as compared with other business
uses; it involves an appreciation of the returns from rates (when rates themselves are in dispute), and a sweeping generalization embracing all the activities of the community. For an allowance of this character there is no warrant."
' These multipliers are used to cover outlays in the hypothetical reconstruction. See Whitten: Valuation of Public Service Corporations (1912),
§ 135, et seq.
Page 455: "And, in this view, we also think it was error to add to the
amount taken as the present value of the lands the further sums, calculated
as that value, which were embraced as the items of 'engineering, superintendence, legal expenses', 'contingencies' and 'interest during construction'."
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improvements it may make, cannot properly extend beyond the
fair average of the normal market value of land, in the vicinity
having a similar character." In other words, the land is to be
valued with respect to the present normal value of the adjacent
land as viewed in the light of things "as they are," but no allowance to be made for cost of acquisition, consequential damages,
or "railway value."
In valuing the property other than land, the Master found
that there had been a depreciation in fact, but that it was offset
54
by an appreciation, due mainly to solidification and adaption.
All that the Master did was to find a lump sum which he figured
as appreciation and deducted a lump sum for depreciation. There
was no scientific analysis of the subject. In disposing of this
Mr. Justice Hughes remarked:
"We cannot approve this disposition of the matter of depreciation.

.

.

. And where an estimate of value is made on the basis

of reproduction new, the extent of existing depreciation should be
shown and deducted.

.

.

.

If there are items entering into the

estimate of cost which should be considered with appreciation,
these should also appear, so that instead of a broad comparison
there should be specific findings showing the items which enter into
the amount of physical valuation on both sides.

.

.

. And when

particular physical items are estimated as worth so much new, if in
fact they be depreciated, this amount should be found and allowed
for. If this is not done, the physical valuation is incomplete. And
it must be regarded as incomplete in this case."
It is interesting to note that in this valuation the appreciation did as a mater of fact exceed the depreciation. It has been
asked by one writer that "if in fact the roads have not depreciated
but are more valuable than when newly constructed, does this
decision mean as a matter of law, that nevertheless depreciation
must be deducted ?"55 And if it does mean this, he contends that
it is a serious ruling for the railroads, for "many parts of the
plant, although kept in repair, may be in fact, nearer the end of
their life than when newly built, but as an entity, the co-ordinated
whole may be worth far more than when first laid down."
"See infra, "Depreciation."

'Problems of Railroad Valuation, Royal E. T. Riggs in 13 CoL. L. REv.

567, 579 (I913).
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The proper conclusion to draw from this case, is that the
correct theory of valuation is reproduction-less-depreciation.
But the reproduction cost must not be inflated by such fictitious
values, as "railway value," consequential damages, cost of acquisition, overhead expenses, or "forced price." 56 And the depreciation must be set out in detail and not lumped into one sum;
likewise the appreciation. Some depreciation must exist for it is
not a new plant, and whether it is offset by appreciation is a question of fact. The basis of this conclusion is that throughout the
whole opinion, the Court condemn only the abuse of the theory,
and do not repudiate the theory as the basic element in valuation. The Court affirmed and cited with approval cases which
had adopted the reproduction theory in preference to all others. 7
They would hardly have done this if they had wanted to suggest
to the regulating bodies the possibility of adopting a new theory
as the basic element. And reproduction means, the reproduction
at the present day of the things "as they are," and not a substitute
plant of equal efficiency.
The Missouri Rate Cases 58 do not aid in the solution of
this problem, for the finding of values in seven of the nine companies was taken from the values of the state assessing board
and multiplied by three. The reason for this was that the assessments were made on the basis of one-third of the value of the
property. In regard to the advisability of this method, Mr.
Justice Hughes said: "
"This term is used as distinguished from the price an ordinary purchaser
would have to pay. As remarked before, it is not our purpose to justify or
condemn the theory which the Supreme Court has adopted. It may well be,
as a matter of common knowledge, that a railroad is forced to pay much
more for land than any other purchaser, see N. Pacif. P, R. v. N. D., 145
N. W. 135, i61 (N. D. i914),
but that is another question.
"San Diego Land & Town Co. v. National City, supra, note i3; San
Diego Land & Town Co. v. Jasper, supra, note 26; Knoxville v. Water Co.,
supra, note 35; Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., supra, note 38. And on page
454, Hughes, J., used this language: "It is clear that in ascertaining the
present value we are not limited to the consideration of the amount of the
actual investment.

. . . As the company may not be protected in its actual

investment, if the value of its property be plainly less, so the making of a just
return for the use of the property involves the recognition of its fair value if
it be more than it costs." This is clearly in line with the reproduction theory.
u230 U. S. 474 (913).
Page 498. And the same may be said of the valuation in the Arkansas
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"None of the members of the state assessing board were examined. There is no satisfactory proof of the grounds of their
judgment. Nor was it shown that these valuations, made by them
for the purpose of taxation, were upon a basis which could properly
be taken in determining the fair value, where the sufficiency of prescribed rates is involved and the issue is one of confiscation."
That the reproduction-less-depreciation theory is the one
adhered to to-day by the Supreme Court, appears to be the view of
counsel in these valuation cases. In San Joaquinand King River
Canal Company v. Stanislaus County,60 the Master valued the
property under the reproduction-less-depreciation theory. He
repudiated the market value theory for the reason that there was
really no market for public utilities and that the sale is based on
61
the rate of return which is the unsolved question in these cases.
However, the Master and the lower court refused to allow a
value on the "water rights" claimed by the company. The
validity of a valuation of the "water rights" was the only question argued on the appeal to the Supreme Court, for "if the
plaintiff is entitled to six per cent. upon its tangible property
alone, it is agreed that the orders must stand." 82
The Supreme Court's view of the proper or basic theory of
valuation for rate regulation may be tested from a second standpoint. It is logical to state that by excluding from a comprehensive statement the part which does not apply to the solution of
the problem, that which remains of the statement does necessarily apply. In Smyth v. Ames,63 which is regarded as the fountain head of this branch of the law, Mr. Justice Harlan made
this comprehensive statement:
"And in order to ascertain that value, the original cost of construction, the amount expended in permanent improvements, the
amount and market value of its bonds and stocks, the present as
compared with the original cost of construction, the probable earning capacity of the property under the particular rates preescribed,
Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 553 (1913), where the valuation of the state board of
assessors was multiplied by two.
m191 Fed. 875 ( gx).
Page 88o.
233 U. S. 454 (April 27, 1914).
'Supra, note 1o.
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and the sums required to meet operating expenses are all matters
for consideration, and are to be given such weight as may be just
and right in each case."
It will be noticed that "the probable earning capacity of
the property under the particular rates prescribed and the sums
required to meet operating expenses," have nothing to do with
the question of valuation. They follow the final determination
of the value of the plant and are material only in determining
whether the rate will be sufficient to afford a proper return on
the determined value. Then there remains only two possible
theories:
(i) Actual cost, which is represented by the statement "the
original cost of construction, the amount expended in permanent
improvements, the amount and market value of its stocks and
bonds."
(2) Reproduction-less-depreciation, "the present as compared with the original cost of construction."
In all the cases from Smyth v. Ames, down to the present
day, it was evident that the Supreme Court have rejected the
original cost plus improvements in favor of the present cost of
construction. And in a footnote is appended a list of cases which
for one reason or another refuse to give any weight to the market
value of the bonds and stocks."4 The inference from this line
of argument is that the only basic principle of valuation which
the Supreme Court will regard is the reproduction-Iess-depreciation theory. And yet, this cannot be stated with assurance, for
as late as the Minnesota Rate Cases, doubt is thrown upon any
settled theory when Mr. Justice Hughes said:
"The ascertainment of the value is not controlled by artificial
rules. It is not a matter of formulas, but there must be a reasonable
judgment, having its basis on a proper consideration of all relevant
facts. The scope of the inquiry was thus broadly described in
Smyth v. Ames.

.

...

"San Diego Land Co. v. National' City, 174 U. S. 739, 757 (i898);
Chicago, Milwaukee, etc., Rwy. v. Tompkins, 176 U. S. 167, i75 (1goo); Stanislaus County v. San Joaquin Co., 192 U. S. 201, 214 (903); Knoxville
v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U. S. i, ir (igog); Minnesota Rate Cases,
230

U. S. 355, 440 (1913).

'And then followed the above quotation from that celebrated case.
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And it is also interesting to find that the federal act of
March I, i913,66 which in amending the Commerce Act gives

the Interstate Commerce Commission the power to value all
interstate railroads, does not limit tlhe valuation to any .one
theory. There are three theories specifically enumerated: (i)
original cost to date; (2) reproduction new; (3) reproduction-less-depreciation. The value obtained in each theory is
to be analyzed and the difference in result, if any, explained. It
will be noticed that no special mention was made of the market
value theory. But in the same paragraph the Commission is
authorized to "ascertain and report separately other values, and
elements of value, if any, of the property of such common carrier,
and an analysis of the methods of valuation employed, and of the
reasons for any differences, between any such value, and each of
the foregoing cost values."' 67 This gives the Commission power
to suggest any theory.
It is probable that the final valuation of the Commission
will settle this perplexing problem. As the act makes the final
valuation "prima facie evidence of the property in all proceedings" to enforce the Commerce Act, it is not likely that the
United States Supreme Court will overthrow the valuation, unless grossly unfair.
DEPRECIATION.

Depreciation has been defined "as the loss in value of some
destructible property over and above current repairs." 1 It is of
two kinds: physical, and functional. The former "is the result
of deterioration due to wear and age. It results from decay, and
the action of the elements." The latter "is the result of lack of
adaption to function. It results from changed conditions and
surroundings which render the structure ill adapted to its work;
from growth of the business which renders the structure inade"37 United States Statutes at Large (Part I), 7oi.
It will will also be noticed that the stocks and bonds are only to be
considered under the heading: "The original cost to date." This is provided
by the fourth sub-section of § 19a of the act.
'Cumberland Tel. Co. v. Louisville, 187 Fed. 637, 653 (Ig4).
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quate, or to decline of business which renders it too large; from
the development of the art which makes desirable the substitution
of other methods, equipment and structure." 2 The physical
depreciation is a constant factor, but functional depreciation is
not. "It may come into play during the lifetime of a particular
structure or it may not."
In Knoxville v. Water Company,3 the utility divided depreciation into complete depreciation which "represented that
part of the original plant which through destruction or obsolesence had actually perished as useful property," and incomplete
depreciation which "represented the impairment in value of the
parts of the plant which remained in existence and were continued in use." It is submitted that the term "complete depreciation" has no place in such a valuation. The plant is to be
reproduced as it stands at the time of the valuation, 4 and,
therefore, there is no deed in determining what parts have been
discarded either as worn-out or as inadequate to satisfy present
needs. When the parts which have replaced those discarded
parts are valued the plant which is used and useful in the
present day service will be valued and that is all that is required.
There seems to be no reason why an engine which has been discarded either because it was worn-out or obsolete ought to figure
in the present valuation. It is the engine that has replaced the
old one that is considered and valued. For example: In a water
plant one section of the main had so deteriorated that it had to
be replaced by a new section. At the time of valuation this new
section had been in use a year. The reproduction cost of this
section would be estimated and then the depreciation which the
section had undergone in that year would be deducted. Now
there does not seem to be any good reason why there should be
any consideration of the section which had been discarded as
worn-out.
In the regulation of rates depreciation is considered in two
'Whitten (1912 Ed.), § 391: "The terms inadequacy and obsolescence are
often used to denote in part what is here termed functional depreciation."

a2r2

U. S. r, 13 (i9o9).

' San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Jasper, I89 U. S. 439, 446

(I903).
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distinct phases: (i) Accrued Depreciation, and (2) Annual Depreciation Allowance. The former is dealt with in the question
of valuation upon which a return is allowed under the theory of
reproduction-less-depreciation, while the latter is treated under
the essentials necessary to earn the proper return and to keep
the investment in tact. Broadly speaking the former has to do
with the present value and the latter with the rate permitted on
that value.
Accrued Depreciation.
It is well established that the Supreme Court will not consider accrued physical depreciation in any other light except as a
deduction from the cost of reproduction new. 5 The cost of
reproduction new would otherwise lead to obviously incorrect
results if it "is not diminished by the depreciation which has
come from age and use." This rule has been criticised because
it fails to distinguish between purchase and rental values, for
while it is true that "purchase value is affected by age and wear,
rental value in the absence of decreased deficiency is not." 6 It
is submitted that the depreciation the Court have in mind is that
which is due not only to the wear, but also due to the age of the
plant in that its life of usefulness is shorter than a newly constructed plant, although it may be as efficient. And even if a
used plant is deemed more efficient yet it is subject to the depreciation from age because its life of usefulness has been shortened.
"It is also to be noted" said Mr. Justice Hughes in the Minnesota
Rate Cases, "that the depreciation in question is not that which
has been overcome by repairs and replacements, but is the actual
existing depreciation in the plant as compared with a new one."
The thought here is that the accrued depreciation represents the
loss which is due to deterioration which has not been" replaced
and also the loss of part of the life of the plant.
The accrued depreciation does not include any provision
for functional depreciation, save possibly for the decline of the
'Knoxville v. Water Co., supra, note 3; Minn. Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352,
457 (1x913); Montana, etc., R. R. v. Commission, i88 Fed. o9i (E912); Bonbright v. Commission, 2io Fed. 44 (1913).
'Mr. W. H. Winslow, see Whitten (1914), § 128,

for this argument.
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business which has rendered the plant too large for present use.
The reason for this is that the plant is to be reproduced as it is
and not acording to the latest approved designs. 7 Hence although "the structure may be ill adapted to its work," and
although it may be too small, or perhaps a new invention has
scientifically relegated parts of the plant to the scrap heap,
nevertheless it is the plant in being that is to be given a reproduction value and not a hypothetical plant which, according to
the savants, would be perfect.8 And that portion of the utility
which is needless for the present use, either because the patrons
have fallen off or have not increased as rapidly as expected,
cannot be considered in the present valuation. 9 It might be
argued that it is better not to class it under this heading for it
really is given no valuation at all; it is not a consideration in the
valuation.
Hand in hand with the question of accrued depreciation is
the allowance for appreciation. Appreciation is the increase of
certain portions of the plant above the cost of reproduction new.
Under the reproduction-less-depreciation theory most of the
appreciation is taken care of in the valuation, for the plant is
hypothetically rebuilt at the present fair prices of the land,
tools, equipment, etc. But there are certain forms of appreciation which have to be valued separately. One form is known as
"solidification and adaption." This was one of the features of
the Minnesota Rate Cases. Judge Sanborn allowed a certain sum
for solidification and adaption of the roadbed but failed to
designate any depreciation. He said: 10
"It is clear that a new railroad may appreciate or depreciate as
it grows older. It may be renewed, repaired, and improved day by
day and year by year as it is operated, until its embankments become
more solid, its culverts and bridges firmer and more reliable, its ties
and rails more steadfast and secure, and its rolling stock more seasoned and better adapted to its service and to the railroad it
See "Theories of Valuation," supra, where this question is discussed.
'This point was not squarely raised in Knoxville v. Water Co., supra,
note 3, and is not in variance with that case.
'San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Jasper, 189 U. S. 438, 446 (i9o3).
10
Shepard v. Northern Pac. Rwy., i84 Fed. 865, gio (191).
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traverses, and until the whole property becomes more valuable than
it was when it was first constructed. On the other hand, its embankments and its roadbed may be neglected and permitted to deteriorate, by the action of rain, snow, and frost, its ties may be
allowed to become partially decayed, its bolts and rails loose, and its
rolling stock worn, without adequate repairs, until the entire property suffer great depreciation. Whether at a given time a railroad
property is more or less valuable than it would be if it had just been
constructed is a question of fact, that in a suit of this nature must
be answered by the evidence."
As the evidence of the case showed that the plant was
more valuable today than a new one would be all the depreciation
was offset by appreciation. This treatment of the question of
depreciation could not satisfy the Supreme Court, and Mr.
Justice Hughes in reversing the decree, said: 11
"It is also to be noted that the depreciation in question is not
that which has been overcome by repairs and replacement, but is
the actual existing depreciation in the plant as compared with a
new one. It would seem to be inevitable that in many parts of the
plant there should be such depreciation, as for example, in old structures and equipment remaining on hand. And where an estimate
of value is made on the basis of reproduction new, the extent of the
existing depreciations should be shown and deducted.

.

.

.

If

there are items entering into the estimate of cost which should be
credited with appreciation, this should appear, so that instead of a
broad comparison there should be specific findings showing the items
which enter into the amount of physical valuation on both sides.
• . .And when particular physical items are estimated as worth
so much new, if in fact they be depreciated, this account should be
found and allowed for."
There are several points to be noted in this excerpt: (i)
that accrued depreciation does not consist merely in the physical
depreciation but also in the loss of so many years of the useful
life of the plant, (2) that appreciation is recognized and allowed,
(3) that there can be no wholesale account of either depreciation
or appreciation, but that each unit must be itemized and its
proper depreciation or appreciation allowed.
Another form of appreciation is found in irrigation canals.
In every new canal there is a loss caused by the water percolating
through the canal which is called "loss from seepage." As the
" Supra, note 5, at page 457.
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system grows older the loss from seepage is greatly reduced
and more water can be delivered through the same system, and
therefore it is more valuable. This was recognized by the lower
court in San Joaquin and King's River Company v. Stanislaus
County,12 but Judge Morrow fell into the same error as did
Judge Sanborn in lumping the sum of appreciation and depreciation. He said:
"After a carful examination of all the testimony on this question, I find I am unable to make either a calculation as to appreciation or depreciation of the latter works of the canal, and shall assume that the one offsets the other.".
Although this point was not raised in the argument upon appeal
to the Supreme Court,' 3 nevertheless from what Mr. Justice
Hughes had said it is clear that such a calculation is highly faulty.
A public utility just like any other corporation is supposed
to have set aside each year a sufficient sum to cover the depreciation, but if it has not done so, the utility must bear the loss,
for the rate cannot be raised to cover this error. 1 4 And when it is
being valued for the purpose of rate fixation it is incumbent upon
the utility "to show that no part of the money raised to pay
for depreciation was added to capital," that is to say, that it
was not expended for extensions. "That it (the utility) was
right to raise more money to pay for depreciation than was
actually disbursed for the particular year there can be no doubt,
for a reserve is necessary in any business of this kind, and so it
might accumulate, but to raise more than money enough for the
purpose and place the balance to the credit of capital upon which
to pay dividends cannot be proper treatment." '5 And the burden of proving that the money raised for depreciation has not
been diverted is upon the utility. If the books cannot show
the exact amount which was spent for additions, then the officers
must approximate the amount for the burden is upon the utility
12191 Fed. 875, 884 (1911).
U. S. 454 (914).
" Knoxville Water Co., supra, note 3. This is one of the examples of loss
from bad business judgment which the investors must bear and not the
patrons.
SLa. Commissioners v. Cumberland Tel. Co., 212 U. S. 414, 424 (199o).
13233
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to prove confiscation. 1 6 The line of demarcation between additions and repairs may not always- be accurately drawn, but absolute accuracy is not required in such matters. 1 7 The Court have
left open the point where there is a surplus after providing for
the depreciation fund, and the surplus is invested in extensions
and additions.'
The Court have not laid down any rule to determine the
accrued depreciation and they recognize the difficulty in determining it. "It is not easy to fix at any given time the amount of
depreciation of a plant whose component parts are of different
ages with different expectations of life." 19
The two most popular methods used to measure depreciation
are (i) straight line method, (2) sinking fund method.
The straight line method assumes a constant depreciation
of the property for its entire life, and consists in laying aside
annually a sum which is equal to the uniform reduction in
value. 20 "If the assumed life is ten years, and six years of such
life have elapsed, the existing depreciation amounts to six-tenths
of the total wearing value. This method is the one most largely
used in appraisals for all purposes. It has the merit of simplicity." "It is particularly simple where what is known as the
fifty per cent. method can be applied. If the life of a street car
is twenty years and the ages of the cars to be appraised vary all
the way from one to twenty years, and the number of the cars
of each age is the same, the average age of the total car equipment is ten years and this is just one-half of the total life. Assuming that the cars in question have a uniform cost new, the
depreciation would be fifty per cent. of the total wearing value." 21
Mr. Wyer states that this fifty per cent. method can only be
used when the following eight restrictive conditions are present:
"All the elements entering into each constituent class (i) must be
similar, (2) must have the same characteristics, (3) when defec10

Ibid.

"TSan Joaquin Canal Co. v. Stanislaus County, i9i Fed. 875, 889 (I9I1).
'Supra, note 1S.
Supra, note 3.
Wyer: Regulations, Valuations and Depreciation of Utilities (913)"
1363.
"Whitten (1914), §394.
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tive, must be renewed piecemeal, (4) must be under the same
service conditions, (5)must have been renewed once. The property (6) must include a large number of parts, (7) repairs
account must have reached its normal maximum, (8) must have
been in use long enough so that the constituent parts represent
all possible stages of conditions, i.e., from full or one hundred per
cent. wearing value to zero per cent. wearing value." 22 Where
conditions permit the use of this formula it is easy to estimate
the depreciation .when the cost of reproduction new and the
scrap value is known for the depreciation is just one-half the
difference between these two factors.
The sinking fund method provides, that a certain sum shall
be regularly set aside during the commercial life of the plant,
which at a certain rate of interest compounded annually or
semi-annually, will equal the wearing value of the plant, i.e.,
the cost less the scrap value. 23 There is nothing constant in this
method for the sum to be set aside at the stated periods will depend (i) upon the rate of interest, (2) whether this interest is
compounded annually or semi-annually. The higher the rate of
interest, the smaller will be the sum set aside at each period.
Also if the interest is compounded semi-annually the sum set
aside will be smaller than if it were compounded annually. To
find the depreciation at any time is a simple matter for it is the
same as the amount in the fund accumulated.
Each method has found sufficient authority for its acceptance, 24 and it is believed that this is just such a question which
the Supreme Court will allow each regulating body to determine for itself. The regulating body should adopt the system
the utility has been using in the past, unless a manifest injustice
would be done.
Annual Allowance.
If from the cost of reproduction-new there is to be deducted the amount of accrued depreciation, then it seems only
natural and just that an allowance should be made in the annual
Wyer,

§ 370.

Ibid., § 364.
'Whitten, §§

402-4o5; i270.
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gross income which will enable the utility to preserve the integrity of the investment. If this is not done, one of two things
must happen: (I) the investment will dwindle down to a
vanishing point, or (2) the investor will be compelled to use part
of his proper return to save the property. In either case such a
result would be confiscation.
The first case where the annual allowance for depreciation
appears to have been considered was San Diego Land Company
v. National City,25 where the Court held that "the annual depreciation of the plant (irrigation) from natural causes resulting
from its use," undoubtedly ought to be taken into consideration
when rates are being fixed. Four years later the question of
annual allowance came up again from the same state (California) and involved the same class of utility. This case was San
Diego Land and Town Company v. Jasper,26 and has been cited
by one eminent writer on the subject as apparently refusing to
sanction this allowance.2 7 This case is very ambiguous and it
is hard to tell whether the Court thought that as a general rule
an annual allowance was not necessary, or that under the precise
facts it had been provided for under a different heading. In
the lower court the utility proved that in this soil the pipes deteriorated very rapidly and hence a valuation was incomplete
which did not provide for a fund for the depreciation, although
the regulating body had provided for expenses and maintenance.
28
Judge Ross said:

"The evidence undoubtedly so shows [the fact of rapid deterioration] and that fact should be given due consideration in fixing rates and in determining their reasonableness; but it is not just,
I think, to charge all the consequences of that unfortunate state of
affairs to the consumers. To some extent, at least, it goes to lessen
the value of the plant itself, and this fact must be given consideration by the court in deciding upon the effect of the action of the
board of supervisors; for it must be remembered that it is the result
of its action as embodied in the ordinance that is the subject for the
determination of the court, not the processes by which it reached its
conclusion."
2174

U. S. 739, 757 (1899).

"i89 U. S. 439, 446 (1903).
Whitten (1912), § 51o.
2

" 1io Fed. 702, 715 (Io).
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The underlying thought may be that if the depreciation is
taken care of by the maintenance and repair account, then the
effect and result of the valuation and regulation is not confiscatory. The same idea may have been in the mind of Mr. Justice
Holmes when he approved the action of the lower court in dis29
missing the bill, saying:
"We will say a word about the opposite contention of the appellant, that there should have been allowance for depreciation over
and above allowance for repair. From a constitutional point of
view we see no sufficient evidence that the allowance for six per cent.
of the value set by the supervisors, in addition to what is allowed
for repairs, is confiscatory." 30

If, as a matter of fact, the utility was able to set aside
enough for depreciation, it did not matter that there was no
specific allowance for this fund. The conclusion, not the process,
is that which determines the confiscatory nature of a regulation.
Whether or not this is a proper explanation of the case does not
matter, for if the Court at that time did hold that a utility did
not have a right to charge rates which would provide for depreciation, the case has been overruled by later decisions.
In the Knoxville case, Mr. Justice Moody clearly stated
that before the question of income for the investor is reached the
utility must be allowed to charge rates which will permit it to
take care of depreciation and this is separate and apart from the
question of current repairs. It would be unconstitutional to compel the utility to use its property for the patrons and not allow it
to make provisions out of the gross income for its replacements.
"It is entitled to see that from earnings the value of the property
invested is kept unimpaired, so that at the end of any given term
of years, the original investment remains as it was at the beginning." The duty of the utility to provide for depreciations is
not one owed solely to the investor, but also to the public, for the
only method then available for the replacement of depreciated
I Supra, note 25.
3' It has been ruled in San Diego Water Co. v. San Diego, I8 Cal. 556
(1897), and Redlands Water Co. v. Redlands, 121 Cal. 312 (I898), that a water
company is not entitled to have the rights so fixed as to enable it to set apart
a certain amount each year as a sinking fund for the depreciation of the
plant. Accord: Manning v. Tel. Co., 18 App. (D. C.) Iox. 222 (Igoi).
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property would be to issue stocks and bonds and enlarge the
capital account. This in time would lead to so great a difference
between the real investment value and capitalization value that
disaster would fall upon the investor and public alike. In
Lincoln Gas Company v. Lincoln,3 1 Mr. justice Lurton said that
one of the three questions of prime importance in rate regulations was, "what deductions, if any, should be made from the
gross receipts as a fund to preserve the property from future depreciations." And in the same volume is found another recog32
nition of this principle.
In this, as in the question of accrued depreciation, the Court
have not laid down any rule for determining the annual allowance, whether it be an arbitrary sum, or a sum computed either
by the straight line method or sinking fund method. It is not
likely that they will choose any one theory as long as substantial justice is done to all concerned. As was said in one case,33
"we perhaps should have adopted a rule as to depreciation somewhat more favorable to the plaintiff (the utility),

.

.

.

but

there is nothing of which we can notice in the case that could
warrant us in changing the result

"

In some cases, the depreciation fund was provided for by
increasing the cost of operating, as an allowance on Every
thousand feet of gas ;34 while in others an arbitrary sum was
taken from the gross income ;3-3 or the straight line method was
used ;3 and in another case a certain percentage on the reproduction-less-depreciation value of the plant was adopted on the basis
U. S. 439, 357 (1912).
Cedar Rapids Gas Light Co. v. Cedar Rapids, at page 67o.

3223

"Ibid.
"Eleven cents per M. was allowed by Judge Hough in Consolidated Gas
case, 157 Fed. 849 (19o7); five cents per M. in Cedar Rapids Gas Light
Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 144 Iowa, 426, 446 (Igog), and this was chosen in preference to a sum computed in the sinking fund method. In the Consolidated Gas
case, the question was not argued in the Supreme Court, but in the Cedar
Rapids case it was, and the Supreme Court affirmed the action of the lower
court.
"Lincoln Gas Co. v. Lincoln, 182 Fed. 926 (19o9). The case was reversed
in 223 U. S. 349, and on page 363 there is a suggestion that the sinking fund
method might be better in this case.
I San Joaquin, etc., Canal Co. v. Stanislaus County, 191 Fed. 875,
886 (iii),

reversed in 233 U. S. 454 (1914), on another point
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of the average life of the plant as taken from the combined
elements.3 7 Whatever method is used to determine the accrued
depreciation should be used to determine the annual depreciation
allowance.
The annual allowance ought to cover the physical depreciation and the ordinary functional depreciation. "By ordinary
functional depreciation is meant such part of the total loss from
inadequacy and obsolescence as can be foreseen with reasonable
certainty." 3s The depreciation, physical or functional, which
should be considered when estimating the fund is that which
can reasonably be foreseen. The hazard in the business is
provided for in the rate of return, 9 and hence there is no reason
for considering it again. And, too, the regulation of rates is
such supervision which can be changed to meet the exigencies
of an abnormal occasion. It was stated very well by Judge
Hough:

40

"As to future losses of a kind not known in the past, such may
well be encountered. It is said, probably with truth, that the
crowded condidition of underground New York increases for the
future the danger of explosion, and introduces a new peril in electrolysis resulting from the multiplication of underground electric
current. These are dangers possible, so, somewhat more remotely,
are lightning and earthquake. But it cannot be said, as a matter of
law, that a corporation, even as against its shareholders, has the right
to hoard income for the sake of maintaining dividends in years when
extraordinary disasters may occur.

.

.

. The case of a com-

pany or its directors is far weaker when its endeavor is to capitalize
a large proportion of yearly earnings against the undoubted regulating power of the state."
It will be a question of fact in each case whether future
losses are of such a nature to be included in estimating the annual
depreciation allowance.
(To be continued.)
Douglass D. Storey.
(Law School, University of Pennsylvania.)
'Cumberland
Tel. Co. v. Louisville, 187 Fed. 637 (1911). The lower
court decree was reversed because the evidence was too speculative to warrant a declaration that rates were confiscatory. 225 U. S. 43o (1912).
"Whitten (i912), §481.

"See "Rate of Return", infra.
"Consolidated Gas case, supra, note 34, at page 866.

